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NOTES
JURISDICTION OVER PALESTINEAN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING
ARAB-ISRAELI CLAIMS OF LEGAL
TITLE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent controversy over the establishment of Israeli settlements in occupied territory has resurrected a thirty year dispute
over territorial sovereignty' in the area referred to before 1948 as
Palestine. 2 Ever since the failure of the United Nations Partition
Resolution in 1947 and Israeli independence in 1948, the Arabs
and Israelis have been fighting over legal entitlement to Palestine.
This dispute takes on added significance in light of the present
Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations, and the situation created by
the Armistice Agreements and United Nations Resolutions 242
and 338 following the fighting in 1967 and 1973. These cease-fire
accords have established military boundaries between Israel and
its Arab neighbors that will remain until a peace agreement is
signed by Israel and the interested Arab states.3 Israel has refused
to sign any agreement until its Arab neighbors recognize its sovereign existence. The Arab states, on the other hand, have in general
refused to recognize Israel, contending that Israel usurped Palestine in 1948 and is not legally entitled to it. Some Arab states now
indicate that they might be willing to recognize Israel, although
they steadfastly refuse to acknowledge Israel's original claim to
1. Territorial sovereignty is the closest equivalent in international law to the
domestic concept of deeded title to property. As is true in domestic property law,
territory in international law may be acquired by means other than traceable
claim of title alone, such as prescription, conquest, occupation, or abandonment.
This note will discuss primarily the traceable Arab and Jewish claims to the area
described as Palestine prior to 1948 and in so doing will refer to the term "legal
title claim" rather than "territorial sovereignty."
2. Before Israel gained independence and recognition in the United Nations
in 1948, the land it occupied had been referred to as Palestine. This note will refer
to such disputed area as "Palestine" for the sake of consistency.
3. S.C. Res. 338, 28 U.N. SCOR (1747th mtg.), U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/338
(1973); S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR (1382d mtg.), U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/242
(1967). For the discussion of these Resolutions and Armistice Agreements, see
notes 117-21 & accompanying text infra.
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Palestine as part of such recognition. Thus, the major obstacle to
any peace agreement that would satisfy the Armistice Agreements
and resolve the long-standing boundary dispute remains the issue
of legal entitlement to Palestine. It is unlikely that after thirty
years of fighting the Arabs and Israelis will themselves be able to
negotiate any resolution to such a dispute. Some neutral forum will
therefore have to be selected. This note will attempt to analyze the
conflicting legal claims to Palestine under a standard likely to be
applied by an international judicial tribunal operating in conjunction with or under the auspices of the International Court of Justice. The analysis will be concerned not with the political or quasilegal claims of the respective parties, examples of which are Israeli
historical claims based upon decades of alleged persecution and
Arab claims of right to self-determination, 5 but with the respective
parties' claims of legal title to Palestine. Furthermore, the analysis
will be limited to Palestine as it was demarcated by the United
Nations in 1947,6 excluding discussion of the conflicting Arab and
Israeli claims to other sensitive areas such as the Golan Heights,
7
the West Bank, the Straits of Tiran, Jerusalem, and Sinai.
Before setting out the standard that might be applied in this
case by an international judicial tribunal, it will be useful to summarize the events giving rise to the claims asserted by the Arabs
and the Israelis.
4. For a comprehensive survey of the full extent of Jewish and Israeli claims
to Palestine, see Mallison, The Zionist-IsraeliJuridical Claims to Constitute

"The Jewish People" Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public InternationalLaw, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 983 (1964).
5. Both the Israelis and the Arabs actually claim the right of self determination in Palestine under articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter. Such claims are
here termed quasi-legal because of the constitutional nature of the U.N. Charter's

legal effect. For discussions of the respective claims, see N. FEINBERG, THE ARABISRAEL CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1970).

6. See G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, Resolutions 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
The relevant area would therefore include land east of the Jordan running to the
Mediterranean Sea, north to Lebanon and Syria short of the Golan Heights, and
south to, but not including, Gaza or Sinai.
7. All of these territories have distinct histories and have been the objects of
separate legal disputes. The status of Jerusalem is perhaps the most interesting

and current topic involving these separate territories, since it is a religious mecca
for both Jews and Moslems. For a good background of the Jerusalem problem and
for differing views on the solution to it, see N. FEINBERG, supra note 5; Comment,
The Arab-Israeli War and InternationalLaw, 9 HARv. INT'L L.J. 232 (1968); Jones,
The Status of Jerusalem: Some National and InternationalAspects, 33 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB.

169 (1968).
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II.

A.

JURISDICTION OVER PALESTINE
BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL CLAIMS TO PALESTINE

History of Events Leading to Arab and Israeli Claims

Both the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine claim historical connections to the area dating back to biblical times. These
claims are asserted, however, as historic claims supplementing the
more tenable modern claims to the land. The respective parties
base their claims primarily on promises, documents, treaties, and
agreements made and entered into by the vested powers8 during
and after World War I.
After 400 years of domination, Ottoman-Turkish suzerainty in
Palestine was interrupted by the British invasion in 1915. The
British continued thereafter to assert control over Palestine and,
prior to the Turkish surrender, entered into separate agreements
with the Arabs, the French, and the Jews regarding the disposition
of Palestine. The controversial McMahon Agreement of 1915 arguably promised Palestine to the Arabs after the war."0 In1916, however, the British signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement" with France,
much of which abrogated the provisions of the McMahon Agreement. In 1917, Britain followed with a proposal in the Balfour
Declaration12 to make Palestine the site of a Jewish homeland,
which proposal was also officially accepted by France and Italy. All
these agreements were entered into pendente bello, however,
meaning that Turkey did not officially forfeit its title to Palestine
until it renounced the land at the Treaty of Lausanne on August
6, 1924.13 Nevertheless, it was agreed in 1919 that Palestine would
become part of the new League of Nations Mandate System, and
in 1920 at San Remo, Britain was named Mandatory Power of the
Palestine Mandate. Britain continued to adminster the Palestine
Mandate until 1947 when it voluntarily surrendered its authority
to the United Nations. After considerable discussion concerning
8.

"Vested powers" refers to those nations which had de facto control over the

Middle East after Turkey virtually abandoned the area during World War I. The
three principal "vested powers" were Britain, France, and Russia.
9. McMahon Agreement, reprinted in PAIESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION, REPORT,
CMD. No. 5479, at 18-19 (1937) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
10. See note 65 & accompanying text infra.
11. See Comment, supra note 7, at 233.
12. Letter from the British Foreign Secretary to the Zionist Federation
[hereinafter cited as Balfour Declaration], reprinted in COMMIssIoN REPORT,
supra note 9, at 22.
13. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12 (entered into force
Aug. 6, 1924).
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the proper disposition of a League of Nations mandate, the United
Nations General Assembly passed the Partition Resolution14 calling for the establishment of separate Jewish and Arab states in
Palestine. War erupted between the Arabs and Israelis in Palestine
shortly after Israel's declaration of independence in May 1948,
preventing any institution of the United Nations resolution plan
and eventually giving rise to a single Israeli state in Palestine. For
thirty years the Arab nations have continued to assert the claim
of the Palestinian Arabs to Palestine, rejecting both the Balfour
Declaration and the United Nations Partition Resolution. The Israelis, on the other hand, point to these documents as legitimate
sources of international territorial sovereignty, the legitimacy of
which is reinforced by Israel's recognition as a member state in the
United Nations.
B.

The Different Types of Legal Claims to Title in
InternationalLaw

Having established an outline of the critical events underlying
the Arab and Jewish legal claims, the next task is to set forth the
various forms of such claims. Territorial sovereignty is defined as
"The right of a state to function within a certain territory, unimpeded by any interference from the outside .
*....
1 Although
territorial sovereignty may be achieved by other means," most
states obtain sovereignty by acquiring some kind of legal title to
the areas they occupy. A state may acquire legal title to territory
in several ways, including cession, occupation, prescription, conquest, annexation, revolution and succession, discovery, and abandonment. 1 Because of the nature of the Arab and Jewish territorial
claims to Palestine, however, only cession, occupation, prescription, and conquest will be relevant to the present discussion.
Cession is a derivative method of territorial acquisition by which
14. G.A. Res. 181, supra note 6.
15. 1 M. WHITMAN,DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (1963).

16. See note 5 supra. Other sources of territorial sovereignty may be derived
from claimed ethnic, historic, economic, strategic, and geographic rights to certain territories. A strategic claim, for example, is based on the necessity of acquiring territory in order to establish effective self defense of vulnerable existing
sovereign territory. For a general discussion of these claims, see N. HILL, CLAIMS
TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS (1945); E. LuARD, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DIsPUTEs (1970).

17. For a discussion of each of these sources of legal title, see 1 G. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

398-449 (1940).
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sovereignty is transferred through "an agreement between the ceding and the acquiring states.""' This method of obtaining title
raises issues of whether the ceding state had proper title and authority to make a valid transfer to the acquiring state, and whether
all the conditions precedent to the transfer of titles as stipulated
in the agreement have been met. It is the most important of the
four categories in analyzing the respective Arab and Israeli claims
to Palestine. Second, conquest is the forceful taking of the territory
of one state by another state. This method of acquiring territorial
sovereignty requires that the territory be "effectively reduced to
possession.""' The major issues raised by this method of acquisition are whether the sovereignty of the acquiring state, even with
effective possession, will be recognized through the acquiescense of
states and customary international law,"0 and whether conquest
can even establish legitimate title if in the process the acquiring
state has violated a principle of international law, a provision of a
United Nations General Assembly resolution, 21 or the United Nations Charter itself. Third, prescription, based on the assumption
that the original territorial title holder has not surrendered his
rights to the land, provides that a state in long and undisturbed
possession of certain territory may acquire a legitimate title to it
adverse to the original title holder. 22 The primary issues arising
from territorial claims founded on prescription are whether there
has been a sufficiently active and extended possession of the land
by the acquiring state, and whether there has been sufficient acquiescense by the original title holder to invoke the doctrine of
prescription. Finally, occupation, being an original rather than
derivative method of territorial acquisition, is "the intentional
appropriation by a state of territory not under the sovereignty of
any other state. 12 3 "Occupation is usually, though not necessarily,
associated with the discovery" of certain territory rather than ac18. Id. at 421.
19. Id. at 427.
20. For a brief description of how the acquiescence of states relates to customary international law in the recognition of territorial sovereignty, see H. STEINER
& G. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 258-62 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as STEINER & VAGTS].
21. Much of the current controversy regarding present Arab-Israeli borders
concerns Israeli acquisition of territory allegedly in direct violation of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. See notes 117-21 & accompanying text infra.
22. Y. BLUM, HisToPc TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1965).
23. 1 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 17, at 401.
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quisition of previously discovered territory. 4 Examples of territoria
nullius, territory open to discovery and acquisition by occupation,
are:

I. .

. . (1) Uninhabited lands. . . . (2) Lands inhabited by individuals who are not permanently united for political action. (3) Lands
which have been abandoned by their former occupants. (4) Lands
which have been forfeited because they have not been occupied
effectively . . . . I.-Lands inhabited by any permanent political
society can be acquired only by Conquest, Cession, or Prescription.2

The obvious issues presented by acquisition through occupation
are whether the lands are in fact territorianullius, and, whether
there has been effective occupation of the territory in question by
the acquiring state."
A brief summary of the different methods in which legal title to
certain territory may be acquired cannot, without more, determine
who actually possesses legal title in a given case. Unlike the intricate recording process which forms the foundation of legal title to
property in domestic law, the international legal system has no
institution through which to check or establish legal title to a given
territory after it has been validly acquired. Furthermore, there is
no system to determine priority among the four types of legal
claims mentioned above. The small percentage of territorianullius
and territories whose titles have been transferred from. one sovereign to another, however, would seem to obviate the need for a
recording and deeding system in international law. Certainly the
transfer or acquisition of territory is not an event that could occur
daily and go unnoticed among the members of the international
order. Nevertheless, the international legal system does suffer from
one grievous deficiency in that it does not possess an adjudicatory
system to establish the legality of acquisitions or transfers of territorial title, or even to determine the origin of legal title to the
territory in the first place. Admittedly, occupation of territoria
nullius or transfer of title through bilateral or multilateral agreements or treaties may definitively vest legal title to a territory in
24. Id. Discovery in this context means discovery by a sovereign state intending to annex the territory as its own. Territory discovered by tribes or people not
united for political action may still be subject to legitimate occupation by a
sovereign state. See id.
25. Id. at 396-97.
26. Effective occupation appears to entail registering certain indicia of sovereignty such as displaying the national flag or establishing a diplomatic or military
post.
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the acquiring state.27 However, if the transferring party in a treaty
covering a territory has dubious authority or title to convey it or
the territory is itself subject to more than one agreement or treaty
made by the transferring party, even treaty agreements will give
rise to title disputes. In some instances of voluntary submission by
parties of such disputes, the International Court of Justice in the
Hague will acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy,2 8 but
the Court possesses only voluntary jurisdiction in all cases, which
prevents many disputes from being so adjudicated. Alternatively,
the United Nations General Assembly has on occasion attempted
to resolve border disputes between states. 29 Such intervention,
however, as authorized by article 11(7) of its Charter, is limited to
those situations that represent threats to world peace and security.
Thus, neither the International Court of Justice nor the United
Nations possesses sufficient jurisdiction or authority to resolve
many of the disputes that arise concerning legal title to specific
territory. The Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine is itself a good
example. In 1948, subsequent to the United Nations Partition Resolution, the Arab Higher Committee petitioned the International
Court of Justice on behalf of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to
adjudicate the issue of legal title to Palestine. Because Israel refused to submit to the Court's jurisdiction, the petition was never
heard, leaving the United Nations to attempt intervention and
mediation in the ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute, which it has attempted without success.
The lack of success heretofore in judicially resolving the ArabIsraeli dispute does not foreclose the possibility of an arbitrated
solution in the future. As suggested earlier, adjudication by an
international tribunal appears to be the best long range solution
27. The problem of legal title may persist, however, if there is a dispute as to
whether the occupied territory was territorianullius and whether there was effective occupation, or whether the transferring state in a treaty passing legal title to
another state had a valid original legal title to the transferred territory. Thus,
even these seemingly simple acquisitions of legal title by the acquiring state may
be fraught with controverted facts that make resolution difficult.
28. Prominent examples of disputes that have been submitted to the International Court of Justice in this fashion are: The Fisheries Case, (Norway & England), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116; Arbitral Award in the Island of Palmas Case
(United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932)
[hereinafter cited as Island of Palmas Case]. These cases will be discussed more
fully later in the text.
29. The most noteworthy examples are the United Nations efforts in Korea,
Vietnam, the Middle East, and Cyprus.
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to the question of legal title to Palestine. It therefore becomes
necessary to analyze the standards used by the principal international judicial tribunal, the International Court of Justice, in
cases deciding legal title to territory, in order to establish the test
most likely to be employed by an international judicial tribunal in
deciding Arab-Israeli legal title dispute in Palestine. Finally, it will
then be necessary to scrutinize the respective parties' critical assertions that constitute the basis of their legal claims to legal title
in Palestine.
III.

THE Island of Palmas CASE AND THE TEST APPLIED By THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN DETERMINING LEGAL TITLE

TO DISPUTED TERRITORIES

A discussion of the standard to be applied by an international
judicial tribunal in determining legal title to territory must begin
with the Island of Palmas0 case. It is both the first articulation of
international substantive law on disposition of territory' and the
leading case today in that area. Moreover, the case deals with both
historic title claims to territory and the traditional methods of
acquiring legal title to territory: discovery, occupation, abandonment, and prescription. In emphasizing the importance of these
four methods in the scheme of territorial title acquisition, the case
expressly lays out a standard to be followed in weighing the relative merits of the respective parties' claims based on these methods
of acquisition.
The initial premise of the Island of Palmas standard is that
judicial facts and claims must be considered in light of the law and
overall environment existing at the time the claim arose.2 Additionally, the continuing integrity of any such claim must accord
with the "conditions required by the evolution of the law."33 The
arbitration34 in the Palmas case further stated that "if a dispute
30. Island of Palmas Case, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott).
31. Jessup, The PalmasIsland Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735 (1928).
32. Y. BLUM, supra note 22, at 201. This concept, labelled "inter-temporal
law," emphasized the idea that international law is dynamic, and that the territorial environment is also ever-changing, but that it would be unjust to measure
a claim to territory by any law of political situation other than that which existed
at the time the claim was first established. Professor Jessup attacked this theory
in a subsequent article. See note 31 supra.
33. Island of Palmas Case, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 101.
34. The arbitrator was Max Huben, then president of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, who was selected to adjudicate the matter pursuant to
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arises as to sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is customary
to examine which of the States claiming sovereignty possesses a
title-cession, conquest, occupation, etc.-superior to that which
the other State might possibly bring forward against it.""3 Not
only claims of legal title but display of sovereignty was also considered a significant factor in determining title superiority." The case
established that where one of the parties to the dispute has actually displayed its sovereignty, its claim to the territory must
have existed from the inception of that claim to the moment "for
which the decision of the dispute must be considered critical."3
This latter moment is referred to as the "critical date" and represents one of the crucial aspects of the Island of Palmas test. Responding to the problem raised by territorial disputes that are
usually drawn out for a considerable period of time, the arbitrator
established a "critical date" after which claims would not be given
weight on their merit but considered only insofar as they shed light
on the validity of all claims prior to the "critical date."3 The
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, a later International Court of Justice
decision involving territorial rights, further defined the concept as
"the date after which the acts or omissions of the parties cannot
affect the legal situation."3 9
The Island of Palmascase itself, however, provides no guidelines
for determination of the "critical date." British counsel in the
Palmas case did suggest a list of possible dates that might be
deemed "critical" in a given case:
(I) the date of the commencement of the dispute;
(II) the date . . .when the challenging or plaintiff State first
makes a definite claim to the territory;
(II) the date . . . when the dispute "crystallized" into a definite issue between the parties as to territorial sovereignty;
(IV) the date when one of the parties . . . takes active steps to
initiate a procedure for settlement of the dispute, such as negotiations, conciliation, mediation . . .or other means falling short of
arbitration or judicial settlement;
an arbitration treaty signed by the United States and Netherlands on January
23, 1925.
35. Island of Palmas Case, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 16.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jessup, supra note 31, at 746.
39. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (United Kingdom & France), [1953]
I.C.J. 47. See Johnson, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 3 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
189, 208 (1954).
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(V) the date on which any of these procedures [mentioned in
(IV) above] is actually resorted to or employed;
(VI) the date on which, all else failing, the matter is proposed
to be or is referred to arbitration or judicial settlement."
Apart from this list, however, there is no authority that recites
the factors to be reviewed in selecting one of these dates as
''critical" or how to resolve the conflict when more than one date
qualifies as "critical." In Legal Status of EasternGreenland," the
Court selected the moment when Norway openly challenged Denmark's rights over Eastern Greenland, which was the moment
the dispute arose, as the "critical date."4 In the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case, the Court declined to identify unequivocably the
"critical date," despite counsel for the United Kingdom's argument that "in the ordinary course of events and assuming that
once a concrete issue has arisen between two countries, they decide
to settle it by international adjudication, the critical date would
be the date on which they agreed to submit the dispute to a tribunal."4 Instead, the Court fixed the "critical date" as the time
"the French Government had made a definite claim to sovereignty
in respect of each of the disputed islets."44 While the Island of
Palmas and succeeding cases suggest that the "critical date" will
be readily ascertainable where the case turns on the validity of a
decree, agreement, or treaty, or where the date when the dispute
actually arose is agreed upon by treaty or stipulation, where neither of these situations exist such cases provide little assistance in
determining the "critical date." Therefore, although the Minquiers
and Ecrehos case describes at least what the "critical date" is not,
distinguishing it from the "origin of the dispute,"4 determination
of the "critical date" of a given dispute must apparently be made
on a case by case basis.
The second crucial concept in the Island of Palmastest for determining territorial title is that of comparative title. The case established that since neither party to such territorial disputes will be
able to produce an absolute and clear title, the Court should weigh
all the claims of the respective parties to ascertain which has the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Y. BLUM, supra note 22, at 210.
Order of August 3d, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B No. 48.
See Y. BLUM, supra note 22, at 212.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 219.
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superiortitle." Rather than compare each set of conflicting claims
at various stages of the dispute, the comparative title scheme
traces each claim from the "origin of the dispute" to the "critical
date," analyzes its validity as a whole, then considers the relative
strengths of all the conflicting claims in determining which party
has superior title. 7 This scheme was carefully followed in the Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland and Minquiers and Ecrehos cases."
Furthermore, although the process was not clearly articulated in
the Fisheries Case,49 the Court adjudicated the dispute between
Norway's claim of historic title to its coastline and England's
claims under customary international law by analyzing the respective claims individually, then measuring their overall merits relative to each other. Thus, the concept of comparative title is well
accepted in international judicial decisions. In a given case the
strength of one party's claim will depend not only on its inherent
validity, but also on the relative strength of the other party's claim
and the degree to which the other party has acquiesced in or challenged the former's claim to the disputed territory.
The standard to be applied by an international judicial tribunal
in territorial title disputes contains one other determinative element. The above-mentioned cases generally state that the party
who sets an adjudication of territorial title in process bears the
burden of proving superior title, unless it presents a prima facie
claim, in which case the burden shifts to the other party." Since
prima facie claims are unlikely in such territorial disputes, the
complaining party, often the one displaced from the territory in
question, will have the more difficult task in establishing its claim.
The added burden on the complaining party, however, should not
affect the outcome, since the relative strength of the conflicting
claims, when analyzed under the comparative title scheme, should
rarely be so evenly balanced as to make the burden of proof a
factor, as is indicated by the cases mentioned above.
With this background it is now necessary to trace the respective
Arab and Jewish claims to territorial title in Palestine. Following
the test established in the Island of Palmas case and refined in
later International Court of Justice cases, it will be essential to
Id. at 223.
Id.
See id. at 224.
The Fisheries Case (Norway & England), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116. For an
analysis of the case, see STINMR & VAGTS, supra note 20, at 252.
50. See Y. BLUM, supra note 22, at 230.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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trace these claims from their date of origin to the "critical date."
It will therefore also be necessary to establish the "critical date."
Finally, the relative strengths of these claims must be weighed and
a possible conclusion reached as to rightful title to Palestine.

IV. THE ARAB

AND

JEWISH

A.

HistoricalClaims

TERRITORIAL TITLE CLAIMS

The Arabs"1 and the Jews 52 each propound more than one type
of claim to the territory of Palestine. Nevertheless, the Island of
Palmas scheme can adequately accommodate these claims differing both in kind and in inherent validity, while measuring their
relative strengths. The first type of claim involved in the dispute
over Palestine is historical. Under the Island of Palmas test, both
the Arab and Jewish claims must be traced from the origin of the
dispute until the "critical date" if necessary. In this case, however,
none of the historical claims extends to the "critical date."
Although the Jews do not place primary emphasis on their historical claims, such claims are continually asserted. 3 Just as they
formed the foundation of the Zionist movement in the early twentieth century, Jewish historical claims are integral to the defense
of Israeli existence, as is evidenced by the 1972 Knesset declaration
that the Jewish people had a historical right to the land in Palestine. 4 The Jewish historical claim is based on both biblical promises and a faith in the origin and destiny of the Jewish people in
Palestine. These historical claims provided the backbone of Zionism, a movement which promoted the Jewish occupation of Palestine and eventually helped form the state of Israel." The claim
itself, however, is based on historical interpretation, which differ51. The term "Arabs" is understood mainly to include the Palestinians who
still inhabit the territory or have been driven out by Israel. However, the term
may on occasion also include those Arab people or states who have openly supported the Palestinian claim.
52. The term "Jews" refers primarily to the Zionists who originally lobbied
for the Jewish Homeland in Palestine and to the Israelis who claim sovereign
rights to the land they occupy. It is recognized that many non-Israeli Jews do not
adopt the Israeli claims to legal title to Palestine.
53. See N. FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 21.
54. Cf. Dawn, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation:A Historian'sAnalysis, 5 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 373 (1975). The entire issue contains a number of articles
related to various aspects of the Middle East problem.
55. See generally Mallison, supra note 4, at 983. This article contains an
excellent and comprehensive survey of Jewish historical claims and connections
to the territory occupied by Israel.
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entiates it significantly from the historical claim asserted by Norway in the Fisheries Case that it had occupied the territorial waters
it claimed for an extended period throughout history.56 Thus, the
Jewish historical claim must be viewed not as one of long-standing
territorial occupation and use but of ancient religious and cultural
connection to the territory.
Although the Jewish historical claim lacks strength because it
is not primarily based on occupation and use, the importance of
the claim lies in its strength relative to the Arab historical claim.
Arab occupation of Palestine prior to and during the Ottoman
reign was more significant than that of the Jews, both in terms of
numbers 57 and control. In the period immediately prior to World
War I, the Palestinian people had their own executive, legislative,
and judicial bodies, and possessed a flag." Nevertheless, from the
origin of the dispute in 191711 until the "critical date" thirty years
later, the Palestinians were never in exclusive control or occupation of Palestine. No Palestinian state existed, nor did the Arab
inhabitants contemplate actual sovereignty over the territory."
Thus, the Arab claim also falls short of of comparison to the historical claim made by Norway in the Fisheries Case. When compared
to the Jewish claim, however, the Arab historical claim has a
stronger background of long-standing occupation and sense of territorial entitlement. The degree and effect of this relative strength
in the Arab claim would be for the designated international judicial tribunal to decide.
B.

Claims of Cession

In the case of the dispute over Palestine, the most important
category of claims is cession. Although entirely different in kind
56. See [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116. The Court in the Fisheries Case was careful
to point out that Norway's historical claim consisted not only of extended occupation throughout a period of history but also of economic interest fostered by
Norway's reliance on its continual use of the territorial waters. See id.
57. As late as 1918, the Arab inhabitants outnumbered the Jewish inhabitants
by more than twelve to one.
58. See Comment, The PalestinianPeople and Their Legal, Political, and
Military Status in the World Order, 5 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 326, 329 (1973).
59. The Arabs and the Jews lived in peaceful coexistence until the Balfour
Declaration in 1917 stated that there should be a Jewish Homeland in Palestine
and touched off a great territorial dispute. For futher discussion of the "origin of
the dispute," see note 62 & accompanying text infra.
60. See Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and InternationalLaw, 5 N.Z. U.
L. REv. 231, 232 (1973).
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from the historic claims, claims of cession also fall within the
Island of Palmas standard. As pointed out earlier, the major issue
in claims of cession is whether the transferring state or institution
had the proper authority and adequate title to make a valid transfer,0 ' which remains the central issue in the Palestine dispute as
well. This category of territorial claims also requires determination
of the "time when the dispute arose" and the "critical date." Since
both the Arab and the Jewish claims derive originally from the
British, beginning at 1915 and 1917 respectively, the "time when
the dispute arose" would logically occur when the first conflict of
interests occurred in 1917.62 Determination of the "critical date"
is considerably more difficult. Since the Island of Palmas and its
later companion cases provide few guidelines in establishing a
"critical date," no rule of thumb can be applied to the present
dispute. The Minquiers and Ecrehos case forecloses coincidence of
the "critical date" and the "origin of the dispute.

63

Subsequent

to the "origin of the dispute," Palestine remained under a League
of Nations mandate until 1947, when the United Nations passed
the Partition Resolution. Since the Arabs objected strenuously at
this time and even petitioned the International Court of Justice to
intervene, 1947 would seem to be the most appropriate "critical
date" in the present case, for it coincides with three of the five
remaining possible dates from the list set forth above: "the date
when the dispute 'crystallized' into a definite issue between the
parties as to territorial sovereignty"; "the date when one of the
parties takes active steps to initiate a procedure for settlement of
the dispute"; and "the date on which, all else failing, the matter
is proposed to be or is referred to arbitration or judicial settlement." 4 Therefore, 1947 should be deemed the "critical date,"
because although the active dispute over Palestine first arose in
1917, it was in 1947 that the Jews were awarded territorial rights
to the exclusion of the Arabs.
1. The Arab Claim
From 1915-1916 the British, in order to induce the Arabs to join
61.

See text at note 18 supra.

62. Although the dispute arguably might not have arisen until 1947 when the
rights of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine were really put in issue, the actual
claims of cession have their origins in World War I, when sufficiently adverse
interests were created in Palestine to establish a bona fide dispute.
63. See [1953] I.C.J. 47.
64. Y. BLUM, supra note 22, at 210.
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forces against Turkey, entered into the Husein-McMahon Agreement guaranteeing Arab sovereignty in certain areas of Palestine."
Although Britain later denied that the land included in these
agreements encompassed the territory set aside for a Jewish Homeland in the subsequent Balfour Declaration, as part of the agreements the British were to acknowledge Arab independence up to
370 north latitude from the Mediterranean to the Persian border,
excluding only "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts
of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo .. ."" The Arabs maintained that the agreement included the rest of the Arabian peninsula since all but the southern boundaries had been defined
therein, giving rise to the later claim that the British clearly agreed
to recognize Arab independence in Palestine and could not therefore subsequently promise the same thing to the Jews. Three judicial facts, however, significantly affect the strength of the Arab
claim. First, while the British were in strong de facto control of the
Middle East following virtual Turkish abandonment of the area,
Turkey did not legally surrender its sovereignty until 1924, leaving
considerable doubt about the authority of Britain to make such
promises to the Arabs. On the other hand, the Husein-McMahon
Agreement might be read to contain conditional promises whose
legal effect was to spring into existence as soon as Britain acquired
territorial rights to the area after the war. Whether such an interpretation is valid and whether Britain ever acquired such territorial rights is certainly open to question. Second, in 1916 Britain
and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in which Palestine
was to be governed under a special regime established by France,
Britain, and Russia.17 This joint declaration by the three powers
with the greatest interests in the area probably represents the most
legitimate disposition of whatever expectancy rights or authority
Britain had in Palestine. If that is true, this trilateral agreement
would also nullify any prior promises Britain had made to the
Arabs in regard to Palestine. Third, Britain issued the Balfour
Declaration in 1917,68 which, if it did not validly transfer territorial
65. McMahon Agreement, supra note 9; see Comment, supra note 7, at 233.
This article also provides an excellent background of the events leading up to the
1967 June war.
66. Comment, supra note 7, at 233. This area includes Palestine, although the
British denied later that they intended Palestine to be included.
67.

Id.

68. See Balfour Declaration, supra note 12; Comment, supra note 7, at 233-

286

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 11:271

rights in Palestine to the Jews, certainly evidenced that Britain did
not intend the promised Arab independence in the McMahon
Agreement to apply to Palestine. Moreover, the Balfour Declaration was the precursor of later multi-national agreements that established the Palestine mandate,69 the implementation of which
arguably abrogated the previously promised Arab rights in Palestine. Thus, the judicial legitimacy of the Arab claim of cession
derived from the Husein-McMahon Agreement has weaknesses in
that it may be subject to future dispositions of the same Palestinian land. Nevertheless, under the Island of Palmas standard,
the effectiveness of the Arab claim is not reduced completely if in
comparison to it the Jewish claim of cession is even weaker.
2.

The Jewish Claim

The Jewish claim of cession must be traced back to the Balfour
Declaration, which set forth a proposal for establishing a Jewish
Homeland in Palestine. 7 Although the document itself had no
legal effect in transferring title to Palestine,7' the Declaration gave
initial recognition to an organized Jewish interest which developed
significantly under the League of Nations mandate. 72 The Declaration clearly contemplated, however, that the Jewish interest in
Palestine would not be exclusive, expressly asserting that "nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine . . . . 73 Thus, although it originated with the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish
claim of cession derives primarily from the Palestine Mandate,
which was formally approved by the Council of the League of Na7
tions at San Remo in 1922 as part of the Mandate System. 1
Whether the Palestine Mandate ceded title to the Jewish people
depends on the legal effect, that of either cession or occupation, of
the League of Nations Mandate System. The purpose of the Mandate System was to supervise the development of conquered territories where no government control existed.71 Presumably legal
69. See note 75 & accompanying text infra.
70. Comment, supra note 7, at 233-34.
71. The Balfour Declaration was a policy statement that resulted from negotiations between the Zionists and the British, French, and Italian governments
regarding the Zionist plan for a homeland in Palestine. Id. at 233.
72. The Palestine Mandate was granted to Britain in 1920. Id. at 235.
73. Comment, supra note 7, at 234.
74. Id. at 235.
75. The purpose of the Mandate System was specifically to "advance 'the
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title to Palestine passed to the League of Nations when Turkey
formally surrendered at Lausanne in 1924. The more difficult question is whether in adopting the Palestine Mandate, the League of
Nations retained that legal title, allowing only Arab and Jewish
settlement of the land, or whether it validly transferred title to the
designated inhabitants of Palestine. If the League retained title,
the next question is whether the Jewish people could acquire the
legal title through occupation of conquered territory that normally
must be disposed of by an effective agreement involving the interested parties,76 or whether title passed to the United Nations upon
dissolution of the League of Nations.7" If the League transferred
title through the mandate, the crucial issue is whether the Jewish
claim of cession is valid in the face of the language in the Palestine
Mandate that guarantees the rights of Arabs as well as Jews in
Palestine.7" These are all issues that the appropriate international
tribunal would have to decide in handling the Jewish claim of
cession, but at least some guidance is provided by the Palestine
Mandate itself and the conditions set forth in it.
In 1927, the Council of the League of Nations," acting pursuant
to article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant creating a Mandate System, confirmed Britain as the Mandatory Power in Palestine, empowering it with the responsibility for enacting the proposwell-being and development' of the inhabitants of the territory as a 'sacred trust
of civilization' and to serve 'the interest . . . of humanity in general.'" N.

supra note 5, at 42. For a discussion of Britain's authority over Palestine as mandatory power, see Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the
United Kingdom in the Field of InternationalLaw-Survey and Comment, 6
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 506 (1957).
76. N. FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 33.
77. If title to Palestine is not deemed transferred to the Arabs or Jews through
the mandate, the next question is whether upon dissolution of the League of
Nations, title passed outright to the United Nations or whether title was preserved in the mandate, over which the United Nations merely acquired supervision. For further discussion on this issue, see note 92 & accompanying text infra.
See also Bough, The United Nations and the Non-Self-Governing Territories, 5
NAT. B.J. 371 (1947); Rappard, The Mandates and International Trusteeship
Systems, 61 POL. Sci. Q. 408 (1946) (discussing United Nations authority over the
League of Nations mandate system territories).
78. Comment, supra note 7, at 236-37.
79. The Council was assigned the task by member states of the League of
Nations of solving the intricate territorial questions brought about by World War
I. Thus, the authority to transfer, incorporate within the Mandate System, or
otherwise dispose of any territory ceded to the League of Nations after the war
presumably resided in the Council.
FEINBERG,

288

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Val. 11:271

als of the Balfour Declaration."0 According to article 22, the Mandate System consisted of three different types of mandate covering
"certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire."' Although certain territories are specifically referred to in
the article 22 paragraphs defining the different types of mandate,
Palestine is not included in any of the paragraphs.8 2 If the designated tribunal determined that Palestine was not included within
the category "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" and therefore did not fall within the guidelines of any
of the three enumerated types of mandates, the Palestine Mandate
would not have the same legal effect as a qualified mandate under
the Mandate System. 3 Not only might the original grant of territorial rights differ from the other mandates, but Britain could
conceivably, as Mandatory Power, alter the nature and extent of
the original grant of territorial rights by allowing, as it in fact did,
increase5 in immigration, governmental sovereignty, and even independence of the mandate subjects.
On the other hand, if Palestine is included in the "other communities" category of paragraph (4) of article 22, that would qualify it as an "A" mandate." According to article 22, an "A" mandate includes "communities" whose "existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognized." 85 Although the meaning
of this definition is subject to dispute, it would seemingly limit the
mandatory subject's territorial rights to the original grant from the
League of Nations, whether or not that is determined to include
full legal title.
This still leaves the question of to whom title would pass through
the Palestine Mandate, regardless of whether it passed as an original grant to the mandate subjects, was subsequently acquired by
them, or was transferred to the United Nations upon dissolution
of the League of Nations. As pointed out above, the Palestine
Mandate unmistakably preserved the rights of the Arab inhabitants in Palestine," which provision was also impliedly accepted in
article 80 of the United Nations Charter.8 7 Read with the similar
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

N.

FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 39.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Akehurst, supra note 60, at 235.
Id. at 235.

85. Id.
86. See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
87. Article 80 stated that nothing in the Charter would alter the provisions of
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guarantee found in the Balfour Declaration, whatever territorial
rights were transferred would arguably pass to the Arab and Jewish
inhabitants equally. This would be especially true if Palestine were
declared an "A" mandate, whereby the common rights of all the
inhabitants of Palestine set forth in the Balfour Declaration would
pass directly to the then existing.community constituting the mandate subject.s The Jews would argue, on the other hand, that
Palestine was not an "A" mandate and that it did not therefore
establish territorial rights in the general community of Palestine.
Rather, they would argue that the different mandate format allowed the Mandatory Power to supervise the gradual
"Zionization" of Palestine that actually occurred from 1922 to
1947, enabling the execution of what they claim was the Balfour
Declaration's intended goal-an exclusive Jewish Homeland in
Palestine.89 Resolution of this issue, however, does not turn solely
on the determination of whether Palestine was an "A" mandate.
The appropriate tribunal might find that no legal title would pass
to the Jews regardless of the mandate formed unless the
"condition" preserving Arab rights were adequately satisfied.
Moreover, the tribunal might find that regardless of the mandate
formed, title to Palestine remained in the League of Nations,
passed to the United Nations upon dissolution of the League, and
finally was transferred to Israel by the 1947 Partition Resolution.9 '
Thus, the Partition Resolution becomes the final event in the process of tracing the Arab and Jewish territorial claims from the
"origin of the dispute" to the "critical date."
C.

The PartitionResolution

In 1947 Britain, as Mandatory Power, submitted the Palestine
existing agreements, which would presumably include the existing mandates of
the League of Nations Mandate System, or the rights of any peoples. See N.
FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 40.
88. See Comment, supra note 7, at 236.
89. See N. FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 41-45.
90. A 1939 British White Paper concluded that under the Palestine Mandate
the Arabs had been denied their rights guaranteed in the Balfour Declaration and
incorporated in the mandate, further proposing that severe restrictions should be
imposed on the development of the Jewish Homeland.
91. For further discussion of constitutional issues and policy discussions behind the Partition Resolution, see Eagleton, Palestineand the ConstitutionalLaw
of the United Nations, 42 Am. J. IN'L L. 397 (1948); Elaraby, Some Legal
Implicationsof the 1947 PartitionResolution and the 1949Armistice Agreements,
33

LAW

&

CONTEMP. PROB.

97 (1968).
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question to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which at
the time was the only apparent authority competent to dispose of
territories under the League of Nations Mandate System. 2 After
exhaustive debate, the General Assembly recommended termination of the mandate and the Partition of Palestine into separate
Arab and Jewish states. 3 As mentioned above, the Partition Resolution may be analyzed as the final link in the Jewish claim of
cession or as an independent source of territorial title transfers to
the Jews. This latter characterization raises the problem not only
of determining the validity of such an attempted title transfer
but also of categorizing the transfer in the first place. 4 Regardless of how the transfer is categorized, however, the authority of
the General Assembly to transfer legal title is critical to the Jewish
claim .

The question of whether title to Palestine was originally vested
in the subjects of the mandate or was retained by the League of
Nations has already been discussed. Assuming on the one hand
that the League of Nations did not retain title, the United Nations
authority to establish sovereignty in the Jewish people is tenuous.
Although an adequate discussion of the United Nations' constitutional powers is impossible here, a few such powers are worthy of
note. First, under articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter, the General
Assembly may enact resolutions that promote the rights of selfdetermination. Second, the General Assembly may pass resolutions in order to preserve peace, which is generally thought to have
92. Rosenne, Directionsfor a Middle East Settlement - Some Underlying
Legal Problems, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 44, 47 (1968). This volume contains a

number of informative articles pertaining to the Partition Resolution and the
disposition of Palestine after expiration of the Mandate. For the United States
position on the Partition Resolution, see Armour, American Support for United
Nations Plan for Palestine, 9 DEs'T ST. BuLL. 1029 (1947).
93. G.A. Res. 181, supra note 7; see Rosenne, supra note 92, at 47.
94. If the United Nations disposition of Palestine through the Partition Resolution is not characterized as the last link in a cession claim, it will be difficult
to categorize, for it does not fit the definition of the remaining types of title
acquisition: conquest, prescription, and occupation. It seems more appropriate,
therefore, to look to the United Nations action as a political settlement.
95. Whether the Jewish claim is based on cession or otherwise, a transfer of
title without the authority or proper title in the first instance should not give rise
to valid legal title in the transferee:
96. It is particularly interesting in the Arab-Israeli dispute that both sides
claim the right of self determination with respect to Palestine. Unfortunately, the
subject is beyond the scope of this note, but for general reference, see H. CATrA,
PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1973); N.

FEINBERG,

supra note 5, at 44-55.
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been the underlying reason for the Partition Resolution. 7 These
resolutions are recommendations without binding legal effect, but
the Security Council has the power to give them effect and enforce
them where peace and world security would otherwise be jeopardized. The Partition Resolution, however, involves disposition of
disputed territory subject to a mandate and therefore contains
unique problems that alter even the general authority of the
United Nations to dispose of territory. The United Nations arguably had no authority over Palestine because the mandate had already expired with the dissolution of the League of Nations prior
to the British surrender of authority in 1947.98 It is therefore maintained that the United Nations Charter could not provide the General Assembly with jurisdiction to dispose of the dissolved mandate and that the Partition Resolution consequently was void and
without legal effect.9 Alternatively, it is argued that Palestine
was an "A" mandate whereby sovereignty had been transferred
originally to the subjects of the mandate, which precluded the
United Nations from acquiring any authority over Palestine upon
dissolution of the Mandate. Consequently, the Partition Resolution would violate article 11(7) of the United Nations Charter,
which prohibits the United Nations intervention in matters that
are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state, if the same were
defined to include Palestine.' Thus, it is argued that the Partition
Resolution was nothing more than a political settlement which
falls far short of transferring legal title to Palestine and that the
Jewish people took advantage of the settlement to create a state
and subsequently claim illegal de facto sovereignty in Palestine.'0 '
Second, even if Palestine were a special mandate over which
Britain had complete authority, as the Jews argue, and the British
validly surrendered such authority to the United Nations, there
should arguably have been no change in the status quo of the
mandate unless the mandatory subjects agreed to it by referendum
97. Potter, The PalestineProblem before the United Nations, 42 AM. J.
L. 859, 860 (1928).
98. H. CATTAN, supra note 96, at 42.
99.

INT'L

Id.

100. The argument may break down when the exact meaning of the word
"state" is analyzed. Article 11(7) was specifically designed to prevent United
Nations encroachment on the sovereignty of a state, protected in other articles of
the Charter. By using the word "state," however, the Charter has left open the
possibility of United Nations action in situations, as in Palestine in 1947, where
political and nationalistic instability prevent peaceful occupation of the territory.
101. H. CATrAN, supra note 96, at 72.
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vote.' 2 No such referendum having occurred, such a defect would
invalidate any United Nations attempt to do more than create a
political settlement in the Partition Resolution, without transferring legal title to the Jewish people.
Assuming on the other hand that the League of Nations retained
title to Palestine, the United Nations might nevertheless not have
acquired sufficient authority over the territory to transfer legal
title to it. Although the United Nations might have acquired supervisory authority over the mandatory territory, that authority
would not include power to transfer legal title.1 13 Alternatively, the
United Nations might have acquired authority to transfer legal
title to Palestine since the British surrendered its authority directly to the United Nations in 1947. If one assumes that the
League of Nations retained legal title, however, Britain would not
by definition have had authority to transfer that title or to appoint
another organization to do so. Third, title might have attached to
the mandate immediately after the dissolution of the League of
Nations. Title would then have passed to the United Nations when
it acquired supervisory powers over the mandate, but only to the
extent that the General Assembly continued to supervise the mandate as it had been originally established. Finally, title to Palestine
might have simply expired by the dissolution of the League of
Nations, allowing the United Nations to claim authority over the
territory under articles X and XIV of the United Nations
Charter.' The Jewish claim would be vindicated by the designated international tribunal's finding that title passed to the
United Nations from the League of Nations under any of the above
theories. Nevertheless, even assuming title to Palestine did not
pass to the United Nations, either because it simply had not vested
originally in the League of Nations or because it did not transfer
to the United Nations after dissolution of the League, the Jewish
claim of cession is not necessary defeated. Moreover, in the Partition Resolution, the United Nations established a political settlement that led eventually to Jewish sovereignty as an independent
state. In 1948 that state was subsequently recognized by the member states of the United Nations.0 5 The designated international
102. Elaraby, supra note 91, at 97.
103. See Potter, supra note 97, at 860.
104. These articles essentially provide that the United Nations can step in
and claim authority over territory in order to resolve territorial conflict that
threatens world peace and security as provided in article 11(7).
105. See Brown, The Recognition of Israel, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 620 (1948).
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tribunal, therefore, would be faced with the issue of whether such
international recognition of state sovereignty might sufficiently
supersede the stated Arab claims to provide the Jewish people with
original legal title to the area occupied by the state of Israel. No
answer can be given here, but as provided for under the Island of
Palmas standard, various "acts and omissions" subsequent to the
"critical date," previously established in 1948,106 may be relevant
to the determination of this critical issue.
V.

AcTs SUBSEQUENT TO THE CRIcAL DATE

It would be impossible in this short space to outline all the
events occurring after the "critical date" that are relevant to a
determination of the Partition Resolution's efficacy in transferring
legal title to Palestine. Instead, this section will briefly trace the
important events of 1948-49, 1967, and 1973 as they lend support
to or detract from the respective Arab and Jewish claims to Palestine established as of the "critical date."
A.

Recognition of Israeli Statehood and the War of 1948

Although the 1948 Partition Resolution called for the creation of
separate Arab and Jewish states,"0 7 the Jewish people declared, in
May of 1948, the independence of Israel and exclusive rights to the
land they occupied in Palestine. 08 The effect of creating such state
sovereignty and of subsequent recognition by member states of the
United Nations is crucially important. Some argue that general
recognition by other states will cure defects in a state's title to
territory.'"9 Others contend that neither de facto nor de jure recognition of statehood will extinguish a valid title claim to the territory occupied by that state."10 Given the conflict of authorities on
this issue, a precise holding by the designated tribunal would be
extremely difficult, yet entirely critical to the legitimacy of the
Jewish claim.
Almost immediately after Israel's declaration of independence,
war broke out in Palestine. Consequently, the proposal for an Arab
106. See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
107. Elaraby, supra note 91, at 102.
108. See Brown, supra note 105, at 620.
109. Akehurst, supra note 60, at 243. For further discussion on this topic, see
Baum, Full Recognition of Israel, 8 LAw GUILD REv. 441 (1948); Brown,
Recognition of Israel, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 620 (1948).
110. H. CATrA, supra note 96, at 61.
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state in Palestine was completely frustrated."' Nevertheless, separate armistice agreements negotiated in response to the Security
Council resolution of November 16, 1948 calling on the combating
states "to seek agreement forthwith,""12 were concluded between
Israel and the various Arab states."' Based on these agreements,
it is arguable that in recognizing the 1949 armistice lines, the Arab
states were collectively recognizing Israel's Partition Resolution
boundaries, from which the armistice lines were established.",
Given the general Arab refusal, however, to recognize the state of
Israel, these armistice agreements should hardly be read as an
Arab sanctioning of Jewish title to the area they occupied in Palestine in 1948." ' 1 Furthermore, the armistice lines are no more than
military lines, the function and recognition of which is totally unrelated to the determination of legal territorial boundaries." 6 Consequently, as with the recognition of Israel's statehood, the 1949
armistice agreements have an effect on how the designated tribunal would evaluate the before mentioned title claims to Palestine as of the Partition Resolution "critical date."
B.

The 1967 June War and Resolution 242

The Arab recognition of Israeli issues that surfaced in the 1949
armistice agreements remained unsettled after that date. Although from 1949 to 1964 the Arab consensus vacillated between a
compromise solution based on the Partition Resolution and an
absolute claim to Palestine," 7 in 1964 the Arab states finally
adopted a common policy and unanimously agreed to organize
"the people of Palestine to enable them to liberate its homeland
111. Akehurst, supra note 60, at 104.
112. S.C. Res. of Nov. 16, 1948, 3 U.N. SCOR (381st mtg.), U.N. Doc. No.
S/1080 (1948); Akehurst, supra note 60, at 106.
113. Id. at 104. Israel entered into separate agreements with Jordan, Syria,
Egypt, and Lebanon.
114. Comment, supra note 7, at 238.
115. The armistice agreements might just as easily be interpreted as attempts
to avoid Security Council sanctions initiated to restore peace under the N ovember
16, 1945 resolution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
116. Comment, supra note 7, at 254-55. This argument is further supported
by the Israeli violations of the armistice agreements, which suggest that Israel
distinguished the territorial grant in the Partition Resolution from its duties
under the Armistice Agreement.
117. Peretz, A BinationalApproach to the PalestineConflict, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 32, 33 (1968).
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and determine its future.'

' 18

These events, taken in light of the

Arab position in the 1949 armistice agreements, indicate that far
from conceding Israel's territorial title in Palestine the Arabs continue to contest the validity of the Partition Resolution.
Another piece of evidence following the "critical date" that
sheds light on the respective title claims at that time is Resolution
242, the United Nations first effort to establish a binding peace in
the Middle East after the 1967 war. Resolution 242 serves primarily
to disclose how the United Nations views its territorial grant to the
Jewish people under the Partition Resolution. Resolution 242 specifically required that the Arabs reach a peace agreement with
Israel before the latter would be forced to withdraw from the territories it had occupied during the 1967 June War." 9 Moreover, as a
precondition to any peace agreement the Arabs would have to
recognize the existence of Israel, referred to in Resolution 242 as
Israeli "sovereignty," "territorial integrity," "political independence," "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries," and "territorial inviolability."' 20 The language of Resolution
242 therefore strongly suggests that whatever solution it sought to
establish in the Partition Resolution, the United Nations clearly
recognized the subsequent Israeli acquisition of sovereignty in Palestine. Such unequivocal recognition of Israeli sovereignty adds
increased importance to the issues mentioned above of whether a
gap existed in the title to Palestine between the dissolution of the
League of Nations and the Partition Resolution, whether title instead passed from the League of Nations to the United Nations,
whether if title passed the United Nations effectively transferred
it to Israel in the Partition Resolution, and finally whether the
Partition Resolution effectively created an original title in Israel
notwithstanding lack of title in the United Nations. Accordingly,
resolution of these issues by the designated international tribunal
could lead to the result that although the legal claim of title in
Palestine traced back to the Arabs or all the inhabitants of Pales118. Id., at 33-34 n.9. Delegations from Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Libya all joined in the Arab
Summit Conference at Cairo. Later the same year a National Congress composed
of 422 Palestinians convened for the first time and spawned the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
119. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 3. For a good discussion of Resolution 242 and
the then recognized boundaries of Israel, see Rostow, The Illegality of the Arab
Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 272 (1975).
120. See Rostow, supra note 119, at 275. See also note 6 supra.
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tine in 1922, Israel nevertheless had acquired through the Partition
Resolution an indefeasible sovereign claim to the territory it had
occupied in Palestine as of 1948.
C.

Resolution 338

Since the peace agreement required by Resolution 242 as a
precondition to Israeli withdrawal necessitated Arab recognition of
Israeli statehood and since the Arabs were unwilling to concede
anything to Israel until they did withdraw from occupied territory,
no progress was made toward a peaceful settlement. After war
erupted in 1973, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338 in
order to revive the proposals contained in Resolution 242.21 In
reiterating the Resolution 242 proposals, Resolution 338 not only
reemphasized the United Nations position of recognized Israeli
sovereignty but reaffirms the steadfastness of the Arab and Jewish
claims. Resolution 338 serves as further evidence, therefore, that
as concerns the acts or omissions of the parties after the "critical
date" under the Island of Palmas standard, there has been consistent support for the respective Arab and Jewish claims established
as of the 1947 "critical date."
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the lack of progress under either Resolution 242 or 338 and
the bitter contest over legal title to Palestine, judicial resolution
of this dispute has obvious attractions. Although there is no indication that a treaty granting jurisdiction to a designated international judicial tribunal is imminent, the Arabs and Israelis might
soon recognize the value of this measure as an avenue to lasting
peace. If they do, they could agree in their jurisdictional treaty to
have the tribunal decide either the exclusive legal rights of one
party to the territory, as was the case in the Island of Palmas
decision, or dictate some settlement granting rights to both parties. Presumably, the Island of Palmas standard would be applied
by the tribunal in either case.
In arriving at its decision, the designated tribunal would have
to resolve many difficult issues. Although the validity of and
weight to be given the respective historical claims of the parties
could present the tribunal with a thorny problem, there are other
issues in the claims of cession that are more crucial to the ultimate
121.

S.C. Res. 338, supra note 3; see Rostow, supra note 119, at 275.
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decision. Specifically, the tribunal would have to determine: (1)
the validity of the Husein-McMahon Agreement in relation to
later British promises and the territory included in those agreements; (2) whether in the case of any British promises or agreements, Palestine could legitimately be disposed of before Turkey
actually ceded it to the League of Nations in 1924; (3) whether if
the League of Nations acquired title to Palestine following Turkey's surrender it retained it or transferred it to the inhabitants of
Palestine, or even just to the Jewish inhabitants, under the Palestine Mandate; (4) whether Britain as Mandatory Power had the
authority to transfer title to the mandated territory to the United
Nations in 1947; (5) whether if the League of Nations retained title
to Palestine, such title passed automatically to the United Nations
after the League of Nations had dissolved and the mandate expired; (6) whether the United Nations could, even without having
title transferred to it, have disposed of Palestine and created an
original legal title in Palestine under the Partition Resolution; (7)
whether recognition of Israeli statehood entitled Israel to absolute
sovereignty in Palestine even though the Jewish claim of cession
failed. All these critical issues must be determined with reference
only to the claims made by the respective parties as of the "critical
date," established here as 1947, and the events since then that
shed light on those claims.
The foregoing analysis points up the inconsistency and even the
mutual exclusivity of the Arab and Jewish claims, leaving the
designated tribunal with a formidable task. From what has been
discussed it seems that there is considerable merit in the Arab
claim of cession. There is, however, legitimacy in the Israeli claim
of sovereignty acquired from thirty years of existence as a recognized state. All this suggests the attractiveness of having the Arabs
and Jews consent to a settlement decree whereby a designated
tribunal would be empowered to establish Arab legal title to certain areas in Palestine and Israeli legal title to at least the territory
it occupied as a state in 1947. In addition to defusing the underlying tension between the Arabs and the Israelis concerning legal
rights to Palestine, such a holding would have the political advantage of firmly establishing Israel's sovereignty in parts of Palestine
where Israelis are already firmly entrenched. Moreover, the legally
designated Arab lands could be used as a home for Palestinian
refugees, thereby ending the long-standing problem caused by
their ouster from Palestine during the last three decades.
PeterA. Schuller
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